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Posthumous sperm procurement (PSP) and the use of
posthumously procured sperm in IVF involve the collection
of sperm from a recently deceased male and its use for the
purpose of posthumous reproduction. Since 1980, advances
in assisted reproductive technology, and in particular the
high success rates attributed to intracytoplasmic sperm
injection (ICSI), have made PSP followed by IVF increasingly6.05.003
ed by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open
/by-nc-nd/4.0/).feasible as a way to allow someone to conceive a child
despite the death of the biological father. But it has also
highlighted a number of ethical issues, such as whether
these procedures shows proper regard for the well-being,
needs and dignity of the orphaned child (Landau, 2004) and,
more fundamentally, whether proper regard for the auton-
omy of the deceased always requires his explicit consent to
the procedures prior to death. Such issues have been
described as among ‘the most challenging, difficult, andaccess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
124 F Kroonsensitive … in the field of medicine’ (Bahadur, 2002, p.
2769). This paper discusses a recent and radical attempt to
re-orient the ethical debate, one that claims that the
surviving partner’s wishes are, in effect, the only condition
that needs to be considered: the default should be presumed
consent to the procedures, whether or not the agent did
consent or would have consented.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly
describes some of the biomedical background relevant to the
ethical discussion surrounding PSP and PSP-based conception,
and then outlines the standard positions on consent. Section
three describes Tremellen and Savulescu’s recent challenge
to the standard positions (Tremellen and Savulescu, 2015). I
criticize this argument in section four, and then reconstruct
the argument, bypassing certain problems identified in my
critique and isolating what seem to me to be a crucial
assumption underlying Tremellen and Savulescu’s view. This
allows me to compare their non-standard model of what is at
stake with the more widely accepted standard model. The
concluding section asks how the debate should be resolved.The standard debate
PSP is generally performed with urgency following death.
Following a decision being made by the grieving parties that
PSP is desirable, local legal considerations must be addressed.
A medical specialist with the requisite skills to extract sperm
from the vas deferens, epididymis or testis, or to perform an
orchiectomy, is then required to attend the deceased.
Following extraction, the sperm or testicular tissue is
transported to a specialist IVF laboratory where it is processed
and frozen for future use.
The possibility of successful conception depends on a
multitude of human factors, but particularly the viability of
the retrieved sperm. Sperm viability is dependent on the
time interval between death and sperm retrieval, and
possibly also the temperature at which the body has been
stored (Tash et al., 2003). Twenty-four hours has been
suggested as an appropriate time interval during which
retrieval is most likely to be successful (Land and Ross, 2002;
Shefi et al., 2006), although the actual use of the sperm in
IVF may well not take place until many years later. Once a
decision has been made to use the sperm, it is thawed and
injected, using ICSI, into oocytes retrieved during IVF
treatment. The resulting embryo(s) are then cultured for
up to 5 days before transfer into the uterus.
The process above demonstrates why it is important that
there not be a lengthy legal process of negotiation or inquiry
into whether the process of procuring sperm is allowed to go
ahead; delays could make the path to IVF impossible. This
does not mean that deciding whether it is permissible to
proceed to IVF once sperm have been harvested should also
be a quick process, since this decision may depend on
ethically sensitive matters that require much more time to
resolve. This will be true, for example, if it first needs to be
shown that the deceased would have wanted to have a child
on the basis of PSP (suppose that the standard of evidence
for such a demonstration has been set at a very high level).
Note that the constraints that this imposes on the decision
process are also likely to be ethical costs, since they are
imposed on the deceased’s partner at a time when she maywell be under considerable stress. Whether they are seen as
costs that should nonetheless be imposed will depend on
one’s views of the ethics of the situation.
As we will see below, Tremellen and Savulescu reject the
requirement that thosemaking the decision need to know that
the deceased would have consented to PSP and conception.
For many others, however, the only kind of knowledge that
suffices is proof that the deceased explicitly consented to the
procedures. Crucial to the ethics of PSP and PSP-based
conception, therefore, is the question of consent. This is not
the only important ethical question, of course. The conse-
quences for any offspring will also need to be considered
carefully. Where the child is put at high risk from genetically
inheritable problems or is likely to be brought up in an
environment that is a clear danger to the child’s well-being,
there is good reason not to allow PSP-based conception. Some
commentators also worry about the more general potential of
such a procedure to harm the child (see, e.g., Landau, 2004,
and Pobjoy, 2007), while others think the risks are overstated
(e.g. Strong et al., 2000; Tremellen and Savulescu, 2015). All
agree that more studies are needed to determine the impact
on the well-being of children born from the procedure.
Returning to the question of consent, it is clear that the
most straightforward way of showing that the deceased
would have consented to PSP and conception is to show that
he explicitly consented to the procedures before death. This
is certainly the test insisted on in most western legal
jurisdictions that permit the procedures. Explicit consent
in this sense should be understood as informed consent,
where this includes competency, disclosure, understanding,
voluntariness and consent (Beauchamp and Childress, 2012),
perhaps with special conditions placed on the means and
depth of disclosure (see especially the discussion in Strong,
2006, and Hostiuc and Curca, 2010). Of course, explicit
consent of this type is not intended to override all other
considerations. It may turn out that the situation faced by
the partner after the man’s death is so different that it is no
longer likely that he would have consented to having a child
under the new circumstances, and in that case a request
for PSP and conception may well not be granted. So while
explicit consent is considered necessary in most legal
jurisdictions that permit the procedures, explicit consent
on its own is not considered sufficient.
But some ethicists think that that the test of explicit
consent should not even be a necessary condition, because the
test is too demanding. Men who die suddenly, for example in
accidents, are not likely to have thought about giving explicit
consent to such a procedures, even though theymay well have
wanted their partners to have their child under these
circumstances. There may even be some evidence of this: it
may be known, for example, that the couple had discussed
such a possibility. This has led a number of ethicists to propose
another model of consent: implied or inferred consent, the
idea that it is enough that the deceased would, on the balance
of probabilities, have consented to the procedures had he
been presented with the relevant facts pre-mortem and been
able to discuss the matter with his partner.
The problem facing such a test of implied consent is
obvious, however. As Jones and Gillett point out:
‘… the difficulty lies with satisfactorily ascertaining the views of
those who can neither confirm nor deny assumptions or inferences
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serious relationships would desire posthumous reproduction. Even
if a man was eager to be a father, in the normal sense, that would
normally include both begetting a child (biological fatherhood) and
contributing to its upbringing (social fatherhood) and to disconnect
the two could conceivably undermine his paternal desires.’ (Jones
and Gillett, 2008, p. 282)
The matter may be put as follows. As is sometimes
pointed out, the claim that there is implied consent to a
procedure does not imply that anyone has in fact consented,
but is simply the claim that a certain counterfactual is true:
in the present case, that the deceased male would have met
the conditions of informed consent had the matter been put
to him. The evidence for such a counterfactual is in most
cases far from reliable, however, given the nature of the
case. Even the fact that the couple were known to be
considering IVF, for example, tells us nothing on its own
about the man’s feelings about PSP and posthumous
fatherhood. What if the partner states that the deceased
had explicitly said that he would want sperm retrieval after
death, an account perhaps corroborated by some family
members? The problem with this scenario is that the man’s
partner as well as other family members have a clear
conflict of interest. They have a motivation to hide the
truth, or put a certain spin on things the deceased might
have said or done (Bahadur, 2002, 2004; Schiff, 1999;
Strong, 2006; Strong et al., 2000), and this seems to make
reliance on their testimony unsafe. (Strong, 2006, argues
that if there is indeed corroboration from family members
this may in some cases overcome the problem of bias, but
not when there is no one to corroborate the account.)
The situation is even worse if it is clear that the man had
never explicitly discussed the issue of posthumous repro-
duction, for:
‘[t]here is … no empirical evidence demonstrating which
character traits are correlated with a wish to proceed with
PSP; nor is there any way of disentangling these wishes without
an explicit statement about the exact terms of fatherhood
contemplated and desired by the deceased. That crucial
ambiguity makes it quite unclear what would constitute
reasonable grounds for determining that a man had wanted
posthumous reproduction, if he had never discussed the matter.’
(Jones and Gillett, 2008, p. 282)
This epistemological conundrum is confirmed by a recent
survey in which couples were separated from each other,
and then asked about their partners’ wishes for the use of
their gametes in posthumous conception. Nearly a quarter of
women incorrectly guessed the wishes of their partners
(Nakhuda et al., 2011).
Existing judicial decisions in most western jurisdictions
tend to reflect such doubts about the notion of implied
consent. Indeed, some countries (France, Germany, Sweden,
Canada) have an outright ban on the procedure, but where PSP
is permitted the norm is a requirement of explicit consent.
(Israel has the most liberal legislation — implied consent is
enough, with the test for implied consent being little more
than the partner’s stated claim that the couple aimed to have
children.) Ethicists are more divided. Some think that under a
policy of implied consent the level of evidence required shouldbe set so high that little short of explicit consent would
suffice. Others incline to a softer standard of evidence. Many
would probably agree that the problem of how to determine
men’s hypothetical wishes in such a case show that more
research is needed. Here are Jones and Gillett again:
‘Given the research difficulties, it is (understandably) difficult to
ascertain the wishes of men after they die. However, it would be
possible (though it has not been evaluated) to ascertain the
hypothetical desires of men who are still alive in relation to the
possibility of (biologically) fathering children after death. Such a
study would then help to establish an objective reasonable
patient standard of wishes about posthumous reproduction that
could serve as a fall-back position in the absence of a specific
determination of the father’s pre-mortem wishes.’ (Jones and
Gillett, 2008, p. 282)
Whether even this much is enough is controversial. Jones
and Gillett themselves are sceptical; they think that ‘such is
the importance of the choice for any particular man that the
default (or objective reasonable person) standard is not a
good enough basis for the choice to be made with any
confidence’ (ibid.). Others will not set the bar so high.
That, in brief, is the present state of the debate about
the kind of consent that is needed for an ethical case to be
made for PSP and PSP-based conception. Given the debate,
it is scarcely surprising that there is variation in the legal
situation across countries, but with a predisposition towards
a conservative approach that insists, at a minimum, on
explicit informed consent rather than implied consent.A challenge to the standard debate
In a recent paper Kelton Tremellen and Julian Savulescu
claim that the standard two-option debate is seriously
flawed (Tremellen and Savulescu, 2015; TS, for short).
They argue instead for the option of presumed consent: not
actual or implied consent, but the thought that the relevant
authorities should act as if consent had been granted in the
absence of written evidence to the contrary. Tremellen and
Savulescu’s rather complicated multi-pronged argument for
this conclusion can be divided into two main parts. They
begin by providing a number of reasons for taking PSP
and PSP-based conception to be ethically justifiable even
without explicit consent. First, many countries already allow
for organ donation without the explicit consent of the
deceased, in some cases — and this is what defines
‘presumed consent’ — without even proxy consent on the
part of the family, but solely on the grounds that ‘the
deceased had not previously recorded their disapproval’ (TS,
p. 8). They add that the case of PSP should, if anything, be
even less ethically problematic than the case of organ
donation, since the surgical procedures relating to the latter
are ‘significantly more disfiguring to the corpse than surgical
sperm retrieval’. Secondly, PSP benefits the donor, since the
deceased gains a benefit prior to death through the benefit
of motherhood gained by his partner after his death. In
support, Tremellen and Savulescu cite an analogy with life
insurance. Third, where there is a tension between an
individual’s self-interest and a demand of morality such as
consideration for others, the individual has a moral duty to
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position to support his partner in her wish for a child at
minimal cost to himself (a minor surgical procedure), the
deceased has a duty — the duty of ‘easy rescue’ (Howard,
2006) — to assist his partner in this. To the objection that the
deceased is harmed by such an action, Tremellen and
Savulescu respond that ‘it is hard to see how [he] can be
meaningfully harmed by such an action at that time, as he
has no interests’ (TS, p. 8).
In addition to this set of reasons for their position, which
I’ll call the General Argument, Tremellen and Savulescu also
provide an argument that they say specifically supports
presumed consent (the Specific Argument). First, they
contend that the available evidence suggest that ‘most
men surveyed actually support their partners having access
to their sperm after death’, so that ‘it is a failure to respect
their autonomy to fail to engage in PSP and conception’
(TS, p. 8). Implementing a policy of presumed consent
would be an easy way to allow the wishes of the majority to
be respected. (They mitigate this position by acknowledging
that the acceptability of posthumous conception is likely to
vary according to religion and culture, and that more
surveys are needed.) Secondly, they reject, for the kinds
of reasons we canvassed earlier, the view that a reliance on
implied consent is an adequate alternative to explicit
consent.
Tremellen and Savulescu’s General Argument makes
much of the claim that PSP and PSP-based conception are
in the best interests of the deceased’s partner, and that the
interests of the deceased don’t outweigh these. They try to
bolster this claim in the next section of the paper, and they
begin by telling readers ‘to remember that the dead person
no longer exists, so at that time cannot have interests or be
autonomous’ (TS, p. 9). The point they wish to insist on is
that the focus of arguments in this area should be the
welfare of the living, in particular the deceased’s partner
and any offspring resulting from conception, and they think
that there is no evidence to suggest that having a child under
these circumstances is not, by and large, a worthwhile
undertaking, one that positively impacts the welfare of the
mother and child (TS, pp. 9–10). They even claim that ‘by
not allowing their widow access to their sperm after death to
have a child, a husband may be harming his wife’. By
contrast, it makes no sense to talk about the child being
harmed through allowing these procedures since there
would have been no child without the procedures.
I will have little to say about the final sections of the
paper, which are devoted to more practical matters. Having
argued that easier access to PSP and posthumous conception
on the basis of presumed consent is desirable on moral
grounds, Tremellen and Savulescu remind their readers that
there is a very low level engagement with these procedures
under current regimes of consent (Bahadur, 2002; Kroon
et al., 2012; Shefi et al., 2006), and suggest that many more
women would take advantage of them under a policy of
presumed consent. Because implementing such a policy
requires professional societies to modify their position
statements on posthumous conception and requires assisted
reproduction units to develop adequate treatment proto-
cols, they conclude their discussion by describing and
defending salient features of the kind of opt-out of scheme
they themselves think should implement the idea of presumedconsent, including a proposed clinical protocol for PSP-based
conception.Evaluation and reconstruction
The position that Tremellen and Savulescu espouse is clearly
far more liberal than any of the existing positions we have
mentioned; more liberal, even, than the position adopted in
Israel since there is no need on the Tremellen-Savulescu
view for evidence that the couple were planning to have
children. Unfortunately, however, they leave their argu-
ments for this position in fairly sketchy form, so it is difficult
to know how they would respond to certain obvious
objections. I will focus on just three points, but they seem
to me pivotal ones. In the first place, the appeal in their
Specific Argument to statistical evidence concerning what
men want is quite uncompelling. Recall Jones and Gillett’s
call for surveys that ‘ascertain the hypothetical desires of
men who are still alive in relation to the possibility of
(biologically) fathering children after death … [which] would
then help to establish an objective reasonable patient
standard of wishes about posthumous reproduction’ (Jones
and Gillett, 2008, p. 249). The surveys to which Tremellen
and Savulescu appeal establish no such standard. These
involve men who have had their sperm frozen as well as
couples trying to conceive, groups that are dissimilar from
the general population in ways that are clearly relevant to
the issue. If a survey-based argument invoking the hypo-
thetical desires of men is to have any force, we need
statistically more representative samples.
As it turns out, recent work on this issue does suggest that
in the USA, at least, there is significant support among men
and women for allowing their partners access to their
gametes after death for the purpose of posthumous
conception (Hans, 2014). Hans takes the new data to
indicate that, in the case of men, ‘abandoning the prevailing
presumption against consent in favour of a presumption of
consent on the part of the deceased will result in the
deceased’s wishes being honored … three times more often’
(Hans, 2014, p. 10). Suppose that this result is shown to be
robust, and that similar results can be obtained in other
western jurisdictions. Even in that case, however, it is hard
to see how this constitutes evidence for the more liberal
standard of presumed consent unless an agent’s autonomy is
assigned relatively low weight to begin with. After all, on
the new standard the majority’s preferences dictate that
PSP and PSP-based conception should be made available
even in cases involving men who would never have given
explicit consent had they been able to give full consideration
to what is involved in the procedures. It is not surprising,
then, that much of the force of Tremellen and Savulescu’s
appeal to what men demonstrably want depends on their
view that agent autonomy is trumped by other factors in the
case of PSP and posthumous conception. In particular, they
think that considerations of agent autonomy are swamped by
other-regarding considerations in this case, a view that also
motivates the various deontological considerations to which
they appeal (e.g. satisfying the duty of easy rescue and
preventing harm to the man’s partner).
It is at this point that the overall argument for their
position is at its most unsatisfactory. Although it is not easy
127Presuming consentto be sure (since there are tensions in the argument at this
point, to be discussed below), it seems that the low weight
assigned to the deceased man’s autonomy in their General
Argument is explained in terms of the philosophical basis of
talk of interests, rights and duties. Thus, they claim that ‘it
is important to remember that the dead person no longer
exists, so at that time cannot have interests or be
autonomous’ (TS, p. 9), which appeals to what is sometimes
called the ‘existence condition’ on the ascription of morally
significant properties to an entity. It is well known,
however, that the existence condition has strikingly coun-
terintuitive consequences; it implies, for example, that
instantaneous killings do not harm, and do not affect the
interests, of their victims, since there is no stage of their
existence during which the alleged victim suffers the harm.
The condition also cuts across conventional wisdom, both
legal and moral, about signed deeds that concern events in
which the signer has an interest but which will occur after
the death of the person signing. Wills and life insurance
policies are an example. Even though the person will no
longer exist at the time at which such a deed is actioned,
there is a strong intuition that the no-longer-existing person
continues to have interests that we are morally and legally
required to take into account.
A number of moral philosophers make room for such
intuitions in their own account of posthumous harm (see, for
example, Feinberg, 1984, and Grover, 1989). It is easy to
gain the impression that Tremellen and Savulescu think such
accounts are bound to be philosophically flawed — unless a
subject exists when his interests are allegedly infringed
there simply is no subject to worry about. But that suggests
far too broad a principle. It suggests, in particular, that we
can stand in no relation now to something that does not exist
now. But the consensus among philosophers, no less than
among ordinary folk, overwhelmingly goes the other way, even
if there is debate among philosophers about which metaphys-
ical framework best accommodates such cross-temporal facts.
We can surely admire Socrates now even if he doesn’t exist
now (Soames, 2002, appendix to Ch. 3); and if Socrates has
the property of being someone whose past actions make
him currently worthy of admiration, then there can be no
metaphysical objection to the view that a deceased man has
the property of being someone whose past wishes or interests
make them currently deserving of respect. In fact, some of the
other arguments that Tremellen and Savulescu use depend on
the very possibility of other cross-temporal attributions to
humans who no longer exist. For how else can a deceased
person ‘gain benefit prior to death from actions taken after
death’? Prior to death, there are no actions that can confer a
benefit; and after death there is no person to benefit. And how
else can a husband ‘be harming his wife’ by not allowing his
widow access to his sperm after death? Whatever harm there
is, it is not inflicted until after the man has died and his widow
makes a request that is then denied; and at this point there is
no person to inflict the harm.
Tremellen and Savulescu’s overall argument thus appears
fundamentally flawed. Their treatment of the interests of the
deceased appears to be based on a simplistic metaphysics,
and their consequent assignment of low weight to agent
autonomy quite uncompelling. It is true that the policy
Tremellen and Savulescu supportwith their argument contains
an opt-out provision, and so allowsmen to deny consent to theprocedure. This appears to be a concession to the idea of
autonomy on the part of Tremellen and Savulescu, and it may
be tempting to think that such a concession blunts the force
of the above criticism. But it does no such thing. If anything,
it leaves us with a puzzle. It is hard to see why a refusal
to consent while the deceased was still alive should be
considered binding under the philosophical position they
espouse — why the wishes of the deceased’s partner don’t
simply allow such a refusal to be overridden if she decides not
to take the refusal as a reason for her to reject the chance
at PSP and posthumous conception. Of course, an opt-out
scheme that allows registered wishes to be overridden in this
way may prove to be quite unacceptable from the point of
view of healthcare politics, but that is a different matter.
Expediency aside, such a scheme would seem best to accord
with the ethical principles to which Tremellen and Savulescu
subscribe.
In short, I take there to be compelling reason to reject
Tremellen and Savulescu’s defence of presumed consent.
But nothing I have said shows that the position they espouse
is thereby indefensible. Indeed, I think that in principle
there is much to be said in favour of something like
Tremellen and Savulescu’s position, but not on the grounds
they give. What really undergirds their argument, in my
view, is an unspoken assumption that the argument doesn’t
defend or even articulate; this unspoken assumption is a
distinctive but contestable view about how we should view
the nature of gametes, including sperm, and their potential
for use. (Note that I take this assumption to underlie
Tremellen and Savulescu’s defence of presumed consent. I
don’t claim that it underlies other attempts to defend such a
policy, such as Young, 2014.)
Because Tremellen and Savulescu nowhere articulate this
assumption, it is difficult to be sure of the details and so my
account will be schematic. Here is my best guess. (i) On the
model Tremellen and Savulescu have in mind, a man’s viable
sperm is a pure genetic resource, usable by his partner, and
benefiting both the man and his partner if he is alive and a
child is produced, but his partner alone if he is deceased
and the sperm is released to her for purposes of conception.
(ii) As a pure genetic resource, the sperm is something the
deceased has no interests in, apart from its being part of his
body. That much is also true of his nails, for example, or
(potentially far more useful) any organs or tissue that are
able to be transplanted. This limits his autonomy, since none
of these things can be used to his benefit after death (and
not merely because there is no ‘him’ to benefit). What we
have instead are desires that the man had for the future,
including desires that his sperm be used a certain way; but
satisfaction of such desires does not confer a benefit on him
since they are not desires for himself, not being centred on
him. (iii) As a result, any duties he has as a moral agent prior
to death can only involve the way he might enable this
resource to confer a benefit to others, especially to his
partner since she is the one who can benefit most directly
through PSP-based conception (hence the duty of ‘easy
rescue’). (iv) As a pure genetic resource, viable sperm is
much like a bodily organ apt for transplanting; all things
being equal, the moral thing for men is to facilitate
donation. In practical terms, this is best done through a
regime of presumed consent with an opt-out clause. An
opt-in scheme, by contrast, would severely limit the use of
128 F Kroonsperm as a genetic resource, to the detriment of the
potentially many partners of deceased men who would
benefit from a more liberal scheme. This would even be
true, although to a lesser extent, if the condition of consent
was changed to implied consent.
The crucial element in this model is the idea of sperm as a
pure genetic resource, so we might call it the pure resource
model. Much more could be said in elaboration of this model
and the ethical principles that sustain claims about how
sperm in this model can, or should be, dealt with when there
is a demand for it, including after death. Instead of providing
more detail, I will try to lend clarity to the model by
outlining a competing model, which I’ll call the relational
model. It is the relational aspect that sets it apart from the
pure resource model.
I take this relational model to be the model at play in the
debate between the two standard positions discussed
earlier: explicit versus implied consent as a necessary
condition on PSP and PSP-based conception. In this new
model, gametes, including sperm, are invested with what I’ll
call centred relationship potential: we care about our
potential offspring, seeing them as our offspring, a relation-
ship that is centred on us. For that reason, we don’t consider
sperm to be a pure genetic resource in which we can’t
sensibly be said to have interests after death. If the sperm
are used to conceive a child, the child is ours, even if we are
not around to help rear the child. Because of its relationship
to us, we have a vested interest in what happens to that
child. That is precisely why we might refuse to give explicit
consent to having our sperm used for the purpose of
posthumous conception. Whether or not this is rational, we
may not want a child of ours to be brought up in a way, or
under constraints, that we would not accept for someone
who is our child, someone to whom we stand in a centred
relationship. That is also why there is no clear duty of ‘easy
rescue’: a man may have a prima facie duty to help his
partner achieve happiness through helping her conceive a
child, but since it is also his child it is morally appropriate for
him to make sure his interests are protected, something that
he may recognize cannot be guaranteed if he consents to PSP
and PSP-based conception. This is also why agent autonomy
and the quality of the consent matters so much (and why
there is a legitimate debate about the respective merits of
explicit versus implied consent).
Let me make three points before asking how the choice
between these models affects what can bemade of Tremellen
and Savulescu’s presumed consent option. The first point to
make is that my claim is not that the ethics of PSP is somehow
determined by these models, but only that they add strong
weight to certain ethical prescriptions. I agree that someone
might accept the pure resource model and still think that,
independently of the model, explicit informed consent is
needed if sperm to be taken from a person’s body after death
(see, for example, Björkman and Hansson, 2006, whose ‘first
principle of bodily rights’ claims that nomaterial may be taken
from a person’s bodywithout that person’s informed consent).
Secondly, there are other ethical perspectives that make
room for the idea of relationship in somewhat different ways.
Consider, for example, Confucian ethics and its account of the
special duties that come from relationships and roles,
including those incurred on the basis of filial piety (see, for
example, Tsai, 2005, which considers Confucian ethics inrelation to bioethics). Confucian ethics may give us a different
way of understanding why we (should) care about our
potential offspring, although a way that is broadly compatible
with the relational model described above.
A final point is that the apparent conflict between the
pure resource and relational models provides us with an
answer to something that was of concern in Tremellen and
Savulescu’s argument: the apparent mismatch between
their theoretical position and what they argue for: presumed
consent, with an opt-out scheme that gives men a binding
ability to refuse consent. We can view such a scheme as what
would be appropriate in a pluralist society in which there are
different conceptions of the nature of gametes and their
potential for use. While the pure resource model may be the
correct or appropriate model, we need to make room for
those who accept the relational model and so need to
recognize that some men may choose to opt out. Doing so
allows us to accommodate those who refuse to give their
consent, without requiring us to slate their position as
immoral. (Such an opt-out scheme may even allow the
refusal of consent to be overridden in certain cases,
although for such a scheme to be politically acceptable the
reasons for overriding will need to engage with the reasons
for refusal. Whether even this much will be politically
acceptable is bound to depend on which model of sperm and
its potential for use dominates the conversation about PSP.)Resolution?
I have suggested that Tremellen and Savulescu’s argument
for letting presumed consent suffice for PSP and posthumous
conception is beset by serious difficulties, but that the
option might be defended by seeing it as based on a certain
unspoken assumption: the assumption that sperm should be
viewed as a pure genetic resource rather than as something
that, in my terms, has centred relationship potential. ‘Might
be defended’ is one thing; but is the assumption actually
defensible? That is a difficult question for a number of
reasons. First, because of the way the different models
support different ethical perspectives on the debate, the
choice between them might be thought to be partly an
ethical one. I am dubious, but even if this is true it doesn’t
affect the argument, since nothing suggests that the models
presuppose specific ethical notions like autonomy and
consent. Nonetheless the question of which (if either)
model is correct ought to strike us as a peculiar one, since
it is clearly not a question about the natural properties of
sperm. It is more a question about, so to speak, one’s
attitude to one’s sperm and its potential: it is a question
about how we take this potential to affect us and others and
thereby to affect decisions we might make. To take sperm as
a pure genetic resource is just that: it is to take it as a pure
genetic resource, and not as anything more. Similarly, to
take sperm as having centred relationship potential is to
take it in a way that incorporates much more: in particular,
as supporting concern for any future offspring because of
their relationship to us. It is scarcely surprising that such
different attitudes should inspire different answers to the
question of what is ethically permissible or required.
But the focus on attitudes also makes it clear that the
question of the correctness (or appropriateness) of one or
129Presuming consentanother model is a complex one.Wewould first need to give an
account of what correctness of models means in this context
(not easy, I suspect), and then evaluate the models according-
ly. Here is one possible kind of answer, clearly far too crude as
it stands. Consider the sense in which it would be incorrect —
indeed, deeply irrational — to take a centred relationship
attitude to one’s big toenails, say, declining permission to have
them harvested after death even if lives could be saved that
way. A centred relationship attitude to one’s sperm would
arguably be incorrect in somewhat the same sense if it
turned out (contrary to accepted belief) that genetics has
very little to do with a person’s overall development as a
human being — that biological parents merely provide the
physical wherewithal that the environment then shapes.
Rather than approach the question this way, there is
another sort of answer to the question, to be found in
sociology rather than in natural science or philosophy. We
should ask which model best accommodates the way men
actually think when they contemplate the possibility of PSP
and posthumous conception. The question is worth asking,
for if, as I have suggested, these two models help to explain
people’s views about which consent option is appropriate,
then we need to know whether a pure resource model is one
that reflects the attitude of most men to sperm and its
potential use. It is doubtful, however, that the pure resource
model has such acceptance. The very fact that, until very
recently, explicit and implied consent have been the only
forms of consent that have featured in discussions about
these procedures provides some evidence of this; the focus
on such forms of consent suggests that we think that where
sperm donation is concerned, even donation after death,
men have a more intimate stake in the decision than they
have in the case of a decision to be an organ donor, say.
Of course, the only way to find out with a reasonable
degree of confidence how men really feel about this would be
to survey a representative sample in order to ‘ascertain the
hypothetical desires of men who are still alive in relation to
the possibility of (biologically) fathering children after death’
(Jones and Gillett 2008, p. 282), although in a way that allows
us to determine which of these models, if any, best accounts
for these hypothetical desires. It is worth emphasising that
none of the surveys now in existence come anywhere close to
providing such information. Themost promising survey to date
is that of Hans (2014), but what needs pointing out is that the
responses of subjects in the survey, as well as the reasons they
gave for wanting or not wanting their partners to be able to
use their sperm after death, are fully consistent with subjects’
having an overwhelming preference for a properly adminis-
tered policy of explicit consent (on the basis, say, that
because it is their potential child, they should be able tomake
the decision whether they want their partner to have the
child). Until we have the appropriate information, we should
remain sceptical of the view that the attitudes of (most) men
towards sperm and its potential use after death reflect
something like the pure resource model rather than the
centred relationship model. If so, we should be correspond-
ingly sceptical of the political-sociological acceptability of a
regime of presumed consent.
Let me briefly review what this paper has tried to
accomplish. After outlining the standard debate about what
kind of consent is appropriate for PSP and PSP-based
conception, and then presenting Tremellen and Savulescu’sargument for an alternative presumed consent position, I
described a number of problems faced by this argument. But I
also stressed that these problems affect the argument, not the
position itself, and then articulated what I took to be an
underlying assumption of the argument: a ‘pure resource’
model or way of understanding sperm and its potential for use.
Whether or not a cogent argument can be developed to show
that this model captures the way sperm and its potential for
use should be viewed, my final point was that this may in the
end be irrelevant from the point of view of implementing a
policy of presumed consent. There is a competing relational
model, and as things stand at present the influence of this
model on discourse around the use of sperm may mean that
there is a good chance that the policy won’t sell.
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